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I.  TRENDS IN PREFERENTIAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
By Mia Mikic
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, the aim is to clarify the motivation for,
and objective of the ARTNeT regional study on agriculture trade liberalization, and to lay
out the plan of this publication.  The second aim is to paint, with a rather broad brush,
a picture of preferential trade in the region as a backdrop for a regionally more narrow
analysis of preferential trade focused on agriculture goods.
As  mentioned  in  the  preface  to  this  publication, ARTNeT  research  programmes
have been discussed and endorsed by stakeholders comprising policy makers, researchers
and representatives of civil society.  In the first ARTNeT research programme, set up in
October 2004 at the ARTNeT launch meeting for 2005, one of the two regional studies
adopted  was  “Agricultural  trade  liberalization  trends  in Asia  and  the  Pacific,  and  their
implications for policy makers and negotiators”.  The objective of the study was ambitious.
It set out to:  (a) map and analyse existing trade arrangements in the region with respect
to their coverage of agricultural products; and (b) explore the extent and timing of agricultural
trade  liberalization  through  the  mapping  of  tariff  cuts  and  the  elimination  of  non-tariff
barriers.  The study also aimed at:  (a) identifying the presence of safeguards and other
contingency protection measures, technical barriers, export incentives and domestic support
measures that were dealt with in those agreements; and (b) comparing the preferential
liberalization approaches to the one set by the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay
Round  and  the  current  multilateral  Round.    Most  importantly,  however,  the  study  was
intended  to  be  a  contribution  to  trade-related  research  capacity-building  in  the  region
aimed at ensuring better-informed regional policy-making.
In terms of regional coverage, the study covers South Asia, East Asia/South-East
Asia and China.  Three factors influenced the decision to exclude Pacific island countries
(PICs) despite the original title of the study:
(a) The lack of data for many of PICs including trade flows and tariffs, non-tariff
barriers, and other instruments;
(b) The  small  number  of  reciprocal  preferential  trade  agreements  (PTAs)
implemented among PICs; and
(c) Limited project funding.
The motivation behind this study is the interest of policy makers and researchers
alike in gaining a better understanding of the treatment of agriculture in the PTAs of the2
Asian region.  They need to learn how agricultural liberalization in PTAs interacts with the
ongoing agricultural trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in order to
set negotiating priorities.  There is additional interest in finding out if and how the differences
in the design of PTAs, with respect to agriculture products, affect the liberalization path
both of the actual agreements and at the global level.
Readers will realize that the above-listed objectives were not all met in full.  In
some cases, it was just not possible to obtain data for quantitative analysis while in other
cases the desirable methodology of analysis could not have been adopted.  From discussions
in several consultative meetings and workshops in which the authors of individual papers
had the opportunity to participate, it was also realized that a study carried out by local
researchers of a linkage between agricultural trade liberalization and poverty would have
been valued by all.  This and other research questions, such as the gender-differentiated
impact of agricultural trade liberalization or the linkage between sectoral trade liberalization
and investment trends, are intended for future research by ARTNeT.
Readers will also notice that this book has not been extensively edited.  While
some effort has been made to use a common analytical framework and to standardize
presentation, the book remains as a collection of self-standing contributions written about
the common theme and sharing the same objectives.  On the other hand, it is possible to
read chapters randomly without missing the main objective of the study.  Nevertheless, it is
hoped that readers will find that the chapters converge conceptually.
This book contains nine chapters.  This chapter continues by providing an overview
of state of preferential trade in Asia and the Pacific.  Chapters II and III focus on selected
PTAs in South Asia and East Asia/South-East Asia, respectively, in exploring the state of
agricultural  trade  liberalization.    As  far  as  possible,  these  chapters  follow  a  common
structure and methodology in order to ease the comparison between the two subregions.
Chapter  IV  and  V  then  demonstrate  the  use  of  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)
modelling for the scenarios mimicking the actual PTAs in the subregions of South Asia and
East Asia/South-East Asia.  Chapter IV presents the results of quantification of potential
gains  from  various  bilateral  and  regional  trade  agreements,  defined  as  scenarios  of
liberalization.    The  quantifications  take  into  account  only  agricultural  tariff  elimination,
assuming that trade will fully and promptly respond to such elimination.  Chapter V critically
assesses this quantitative approach and, in more general terms, the family of so-called
LINKAGE models with the main objective of making users of numerical results aware of
the limitations of such an analysis.
Chapter VI goes through the main turning points in agricultural reform in China.  It
also analyses in detail the linkages between that reform and China’s position in the current
WTO negotiations as well as its priorities for preferential trade liberalization in agriculture.
Chapter VII offers some explanations of why preferential trade agreements in agriculture
might  be  a  better  policy  for  developing  countries  wishing  to  revitalize  their  agriculture
sector, compared to the multilateral option that is unlikely to allow developing countries to
“get” policy space for strategic intervention in agriculture.  Chapter VIII uses case studies
of Bangladesh and Cambodia to reflect on how significant non-tariff barriers and design in3
rules of origin continue to be in trade by LDCs and developing countries in general.  The
book concludes with chapter IX, which summarizes the main points of each chapter and
offers policy recommendations for negotiators of preferential trade arrangements.  It also
points to future policy research needs in the area of agricultural trade liberalization.
This chapter proceeds with analysis of preferential trade in the context of Asia and
the Pacific.  Section A identifies several stylized facts about the preferential trade in Asia
and  the  Pacific.    Section  B  explores  regional  trade  agreements  with  respect  to  their
commitment  to  trade  liberalization  in  goods  and  other  standard  areas  of  cooperation.
Section C briefly discusses some international political economy forces that explain why
agricultural products are laggards in both multilateral and preferential trade liberalization.
Section D completes the chapter with some concluding remarks.
Before continuing, it is necessary to discuss the taxonomy of PTAs used in this
book.   The  preferential  trade  phenomenon  has  not  only  become  complex,  it  also  now
exists under many different names.  As discussed above, the idea of a multilateral trading
system was simple – concessions were to be shared on an most favoured nation (MFN)
basis by the members of the club, and only a few exceptions from this principle were
envisaged.  At that time, the practice of preferential trade recognized free trade areas,
Customs Unions (CUs), and economic and political unions.
1  Theoretical literature also
followed this path and taxonomy was developed that described an extension of integration
from shallow agreements such as the free trade area, through intermediate such as the
CU, to deep agreements such as the common market and economic/monetary union.  The
focus, which also reflected the spirit of GATT exceptions, was of course on deeper and
regional (plurilateral) rather than bilateral agreements.
A.  Stylized facts
2
There  are  four  clear,  stylized  facts  about  the  Asian  and  Pacific  approach  to
preferential trade arising from analysis of information in APTIAD:
1. Bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) are the preferred option.  South-East Asian
economies have signed and enforced BTAs more frequently than the South
Asian economies.  However, cross-continental BTAs grow equally fast.
2. The “noodle bowl” effect is worsening, as there is no standard or common
template for the rules.  The current multiple trade rules are often mismatching
and conflicting.
1 Excluding so-called preferential clubs based on colonial trade concessions.
2 An early version of this chapter was presented at the APO Study Meeting held in New Delhi in
March 2007.  The chapter relies mostly on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database
(APTIAD) in sourcing data and information for analysis.  APTIAD is available at www.unescap.org/tid/
aptiad4
3. Multiple memberships are easily tolerated.
4. There is only weak evidence that PTAs create new trade among the member
countries.  However, evidence of trade diversion for non-members is even
weaker.
Each of these four facts is discussed and illustrated below.
1.  The bilateral option
Figure I indicates that of the 87 agreements in force, in early 2007, 62 (71 per cent)
are  BTAs,  while  the  country-bloc  agreements  and  RTAs
3  comprise  the  rest.    Of  those
BTAs, 77.5 per cent are between two economies in the region and 22.5 per cent are of
so-called  cross-continental  scope.    There  are  11  agreements  (12.6  per  cent)  between
a country and a bloc, and 11 RTAs (12.6 per cent).  Among country-bloc agreements, six
(55 per cent) are with ASEAN and three with EFTA (27 per cent).  While RTAs are greatly
outnumbered  by  BTAs,  they  do  have  relatively  large  membership  (on  average,
8.8 economies).
4  Nine (82 per cent) comprise membership from ESCAP only, while two
(18 per cent) include non-ESCAP members.
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Looking at the type of the agreements (which should be in compliance with the
multilateral trading rules), in both the bilateral and regional categories, the majority are
free  trade  agreements  (FTAs)  and  framework  agreements  (FA).   Among  the  62  BTAs,
50 (80 per cent) are listed as FTAs and seven (11.3 per cent) as framework agreements.
The rest include four preferential trading agreements (6 per cent) and one non-reciprocal
agreement.  In contrast, the 14 cross-continental BTAs include eight (57 per cent) FTAs,
four (28.6 per cent) of FAs and two other agreements.  In the category of country-bloc
PTAs,  the  structure  is  very  different  with  more  than  half  being  framework  agreements
(55 per cent), and rest made up of FTAs (36 per cent) and one CU (EC-Turkey).  The
results for RTAs show a combination of the previous two classes of agreements; one CU
(EAEC) and four PTAs (in the category of “others”), four (36 per cent) FTAs and two FAs
(18 per cent).
3 Zhai  (2006)  commented  that  BTAs  were  preferred  because  of  their  lesser  costs  in  terms  of
negotiation and enforcement efforts.  While this might hold true for every individual member of BTAs,
the  resulting  costs  for  all  BTAs  might  easily  be  higher  compared  with  all  RTAs.  Bonapace  (oral
communication) argues that this could be because of the lack of “peer pressure” as well as institutional
framework that is often missing from BTAs but built in to many RTAs.  Feridhanusetyawan (2005) held
that the faster increase in BTAs than in RTAs (plurilateral agreements) contributed to a complexity of
the picture, as many of those BTAs arose “within and across different regional agreements”.
4 The ASEAN FTA in Goods (AFTA) and in Services (AFAS) are counted as two RTAs; if only AFTA
is counted, average membership is 9.7.
































Source: APTIAD, February 2007.
Note: The number does not add up to 87, as three other agreements are not shown (one global
and two country-plurilateral).
R = intraregional bilateral agreements.
XC = cross-continental bilateral agreements.
Figure I.  Mapping of Asia-Pacific preferential trade
It is important to note that the process of regional integration in Asia and the Pacific
started in earnest in the 1990s, and more precisely during and after the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 (figure II).  Only one trade agreement dates back to 1975 – the Asia-Pacific
Trade Agreement (APTA), formerly known as the “Bangkok Agreement”.  Other agreements
predating  the  1990s  are  the Australia-New  Zealand  Closer  Economic  Relations  Trade
Agreement (ANZCERTA, 1983) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN,
1967); however, the latter grew more out of political rather than trade motivations.
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This chapter does not seek to explain in detail the proliferation of BTAs and RTAs
in the region during the past decade, as there were different factors in play.  Some strongly
believe that regionalism flourished because governments realized that BTAs and RTAs
allowed  for  a  faster,  more  tailored  approach  to  specific  country  needs  and  were  more
flexible  in  terms  of  implementation  time  and  the  inclusion  of  behind-border  measures.
Another  explanation  refers  to  the  political  and  strategic  motivations,  which  enhanced
intraregional  cooperation  during  the Asian  financial  crisis  in  1997.    Yet  another  factor
associated with the spread of regionalism is the so-called “domino effect” that increases
6 Feridhanusetyawan (2005, p. 14), stated “ASEAN was established during the Cold War to maintain
peace and security in the region, and the formation of AFTA in 1992 kept ASEAN relevant when the
Cold War ended.”6
the incentive for countries to join existing agreements (the “follow the crowd” effect), and
which explains why so many governments will engage in the process of BTA and RTA
negotiations.  Bonapace and Mikic (2005; 2007, forthcoming) have addressed these and
other factors driving the proliferation of PTAs in the region during the past decade.
2.  Multiple and potentially conflicting trade rules
The fast multiplication of agreements shown in figure II resulted in an increasing
density of the “noodle bowl”
7 phenomenon associated with preferential trade.  Figure III
illustrates this “noodle bowl” view of the preferential trade routes.  It shows the entanglement
of bilateral and regional free trade and other types of agreements that are in force (areas
and red lines) as well as those that are in various stages of negotiations (blue dotted
lines).    It  provides  a  simple  visual  test  that  shows  how  density  will  increase  as  these
agreements are signed and implemented.  It is quite appropriate to describe this state of
affairs as a “motley assortment” (Baldwin, 2006) that is working against trade creation
rather than for it.  With conflicting rules, these preferential agreements tend to fragment
markets and increase trade costs, thus adversely affecting trade volumes as well as global
and national welfare.
Figure II.  Asia and the Pacific – late bloomers in regionalism
Source: APTIAD, February 2007.
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7 The term “spaghetti bowl” is credited to Bhagwati (1992).  It appears that Findlay and Pangestu
(2001), introduced “noodles” to the RTA vocabulary.  Cf. Mikic (2002).7
3.  Multiple memberships
The previous analysis reveals an important asymmetry.  From 1994 to 2006, the
number of all agreements in force expanded from 10 to 87, a more than eightfold increase.
Of the total 58 ESCAP regional members, the number of those involved in this proliferation
of agreements increased from 41 to 50 during the same period, or 51 if the United States
of America is included.
8  Only one ESCAP-cum-WTO member remains unattached to any
of the trading blocs.  In contrast, most ESCAP members, who are not WTO members, are
members of at least one and up to 11 PTAs.  The average number of agreements per
ESCAP member is 5.6.  This indicates multiple memberships and a significant overlap in
the membership of agreements.
Figure III.  Adding more tangles to the “noodle bowl”
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, September 2006.
8 Non-regional  members  are  France,  the  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.  Their agreements are not covered in the analysis
unless signed with one or more regional members; e.g., the United States-Singapore FTA is included,
while the United States-Jordan FTA is not.  This leaves only three ESCAP members (Mongolia, Palau
and Timor-Leste) and five ESCAP associate members (American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam,
New Caledonia and Northern Mariana Islands) not involved in preferential trade at present. Of those
countries, only Mongolia is also a World Trade Organization member.8
Overlapping memberships arise from parallel BTAs and RTAs for the same set of
economies.  One country ends up negotiating with another under several unrelated framework
agreements.  As an example of this option, consider the case of India and Sri Lanka,
which have at least four trade-related agreements.  The oldest is APTA, 1975, by type
a preferential agreement, currently among six members.  Other regional agreements include
the BIMSTEC, 1997 and SAARC, 1985/SAPTA,
9 1995 and SAFTA,
10 2006 agreements
among the same members.  In addition, India and Sri Lanka signed a bilateral FTA in
2001.
It turns out that India leads in terms of overlapping memberships.  This overlap
occurs not only with Sri Lanka, as mentioned above, but also in the case of Thailand
(BIMSTEC, AFTA-India and BTA).  Furthermore, India has BTAs with almost all countries
that are also members of SAPTA/SAFTA and BIMSTEC as well as with most members of
APTA and some of AFTA (figure IV).  The important question, which is not discussed in this
publication, concerns the economic and political reasons for a country to negotiate parallel
and seemingly non-related agreements that include the same subset of members.
9 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation/South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Preferential Trade Agreement.
10 South Asian Free Trade Area.
Figure IV.  Leader in multiple memberships9
Singapore is implementing the largest number of agreements,
11 but does not appear
to be overlapping their members.  A small degree of overlap appears in the case of deals
with India (the Singapore-India BTA and AFTA-India agreement) and with New Zealand
(one BTA and one plurilateral).
Multiple  and  overlapping  membership  is  spread  across  this  region.    Only  eight
ESCAP members and associate members are not involved in the PTA process (Mongolia,
Palau and Timor-Leste from among the ESCAP members, and American Samoa, French
Polynesia,  Guam,  New  Caledonia  and  Northern  Mariana  Islands  from  the  associate
members).  It appears that signing and implementing between one and three agreements
is either most beneficial, most popular or the easiest, as 21 countries implement from one
to three agreements (seven in each category).  Implementing more than three agreements
is more demanding, and the number of countries managing to do so decreases sharply as
the  number  of  agreements  increases  (see  the  trend  line  in  figure  V).    The  maximum
number of agreements per single country is implemented by Singapore (19), followed by
Thailand (14), India (13), Malaysia (12) and Turkey (12).  The average number of agreements
in force per country, not counting those countries without any agreements, is 5.6.  The
average number of all agreements per country, again excluding the eight without agreements,
is seven.
11 Seven of these are bilateral, with various but mostly high-income economies (Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States).
Figure V.  ESCAP economies in multiple PTA memberships, 2006
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Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, August 2006.10
The issue, however, is that with multiple agreements one does not know which
particular set of rules drives trade growth or which set might act as an obstacle.  In the
India-Sri Lanka case, while plausible to associate trade growth with the 2001 FTA, it is
important to be able to identify any contribution by other agreements.  The question should
also be asked whether an even larger increase in trade could have been achieved with
fewer agreements and, arguably, lower costs.  Finally, one should not ignore the impact of
unilateral liberalization processes in countries that are party to the agreement.  Sri Lanka
started to simplify and lighten its protective regime in late 1970s, and by the late 1980s
unilateral trade liberalization was reflected in the sharp growth of Sri Lankan imports.
4.  Trade agreements in search for trade?
The objectives of trade agreements, as set out in the legal documents and texts of
the  agreements,  include  expanding  trade,  promoting  investment,  developing  economic
integration, establishing regional cooperation and coordination, promoting human rights
and democracy, and improving security (cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005).  Newer agreements
in particular are trying hard to broaden coverage of commitments from liberalization of
merchandise trade to behind-the-border provisions in trade and other areas of cooperation.
In many instances, as mentioned above, members have broad concessional aspirations;
in  order  to  reflect  them,  the  members  increasingly  name  agreements  as  “economic
partnerships” or “closer economic relations” rather than FTAs.
Notwithstanding the intent to liberalize beyond trade in goods, in many cases long
transition/implementation periods are required for any real liberalization to take effect and
be reflected in changed trade flows.  It is not rare for the agreements to consist only of the
agreement (often called a framework agreement) to start negotiations on cooperation or
trade liberalization.  Some anecdotal support exists for the claim that countries sometimes
only intend to initiate regional cooperation without much commitment with regard to trade
or even economic objectives.  This practice introduces unnecessary trade discrimination to
foster regional cooperation in areas that might not even require trade preferences, such as
recognition  of  regulatory  regimes,  or  the  exchange  of  information  and  infrastructural
provisions (cf. Schiff and Winters, 2003, p. 264).  The cost of achieving such cooperation
is then much higher than necessary (and sometimes even more than the benefits accrued
through cooperation).  Furthermore, it leads to “trade negotiation” fatigue that sometimes
tends to be cured by reducing efforts in multilateral trade negotiations, which are perceived
as more difficult.
This section provides some additional information on intra- and extraregional trade
flows and trade dependence to facilitate a better understanding of the potential impacts of
preferential trade agreements.  The expectation of members is that PTAs will help boost
mutual trade (of those products awarded [more] liberal trade treatment) over and above
the growth of their total trade.
Total  trade  of  ESCAP  members  has  increased  in  absolute  terms,  and  in  2005
accounted  for  almost  30  per  cent  of  world  exports  and  imports.    The  value  of  their
intraregional trade also increased (figure VI) dramatically from 1980 to 2005 in absolute11
terms.  Starting with a slightly smaller value of intraregional trade than NAFTA in 1980, by
2005 the Asian and Pacific region had surpassed NAFTA and had closed the gap with the
EU15 intraregional trade from 4/5 to 1/3.  However, as a share in total world trade, this
intraregional trade remained stagnant (table 1).
Figure VI.  Growth of intraregional trade for selected regions
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE data.













Nevertheless, the growth in intraregional trade can be combined with an indicator
of trade dependence to tell us more about the “fortress building” attitude of trade agreements.
As table 1 shows, total trade dependence,
12 which is a contribution of total trade to the
region’s  collective  gross  domestic  product,  increased  by  coefficient  1.7  over  this  time.
Similarly, an indicator showing only the contribution of extraregional trade to the region’s
gross domestic product grew by slightly less than the total trade dependence (coefficient
of 1.64 over the same 10 years).  Despite small differences, this points to an increase in
the reliance on intraregional trade by ESCAP economies, giving support to a claim of the
“appearance of the third mega trading bloc” to join the European Union and NAFTA.  Thus,
intraregional  trade  is  growing  in  both  the  absolute  and  relative  sense.    However,  the
absence of a fall in trade with the rest of the world makes it difficult to identify this trend of
growing intraregional trade as trade diversion.  Furthermore, a reliable measure of a link
between the increase in intraregional trade and the existence of preferential trade (that is,
12 This indicator is often interpreted as “trade openness”.  See Bowen, Hollander and Viaene (1998,
pp. 12-15).12
BTAs and RTAs) is still lacking.  In addition, does trade growth among members of the
agreements precede or follow preferential agreements?  These questions remain high on
the list of future empirical research topics.
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Table 1.  ESCAP trade performance basics
Group 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005
a
Total trade as a percentage 26.8 22.7 23.4 26.3 26.3 28.2 29.4
of world trade
Intraregional trade as 13.0 10.7 10.3 12.4 12.7 14.0 14.6
a percentage of world
trade
Total trade dependence 27.3 33.1 35.3 39.4 38.8 46.6 50.0
Extraregional trade 14.0 14.1 17.2 19.3 20.0 23.5 25.1
dependence
Total number of BTAs
b 61 72 22 63 04 6 7 3
in force
Total number of RTAs 4 5 6 6 6 8 11
in force
Members with membership 20 22 24 25 26 29 30
c
in GATT/ WTO
Regional members and 41 44 44 44 45 49 50
associate members
involved in PTAs
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD and WITS, April 2007.
Note:
a GDP figures not available for 2005 and 2006, and trade figures refer to 2005.
b Includes cross-continental BTAs.
c Viet  Nam  accession  process  finalized  in  2006,  but  it  formally  acceded  30  days  after
completion of the internal ratification process, i.e., on 11 January 2007.  Tonga’s accession
process was finalized in 2005, but ratification is pending.
13 See Mayda and Steinberg (2007), on lack of evidence for across-the-board new trade creation in
response to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and DeRosa (2007), for slightly
different arguments.
Figure VIIa shows total trade among the members of each one of the 10 RTAs in
the region in 2005, while figure VIIb shows those values for the years in which those RTAs
were signed.  In 2005, AFTA led with almost US$ 300 billion-worth of intra-bloc trade, but
members of APTA were not far behind.  It is, however, not possible to assert how much of
this trade in any of the blocs is done under the preferential terms negotiated.  (In that
sense, the bubbles present the maxima.) Identification of the share of trade associated
with the establishment of the preferential trade area is still one of the most tedious forms
of empirical trade research (cf. Mayda and Steinberg, 2007; DeRosa, 2007).13
Figure VIIa.  Value of intra-bloc trade in 2005
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE and APTIAD.
Note: The size of the bubbles reflects the value of intraregional trade (in thousand
US dollars) in years when the RTAs were signed:  AFTA 1992; APTA 1975;
BIMSTEC  1997;  CISFTA  1994;  EAEC  1995;  ECOTA  2003;  MSG  1993;
2PICTA 2001; SAFTA 1993; and SPARTECA 1981.
Source: Calculated by the author from COMTRADE and APTIAD.
Note: The size of the bubbles reflects the value of intraregional trade (in thousand




















Figure VIIb.  Value of intra-bloc trade in years of signature14
In 2005, slightly less than 30 per cent of total ESCAP trade was associated with
members of BTAs and RTAs (table 2); this amounted to less than 9 per cent of world
trade.
14  While close to 60 per cent of PTA-linked intraregional trade was done by members
of BTAs, more than half of that was linked to BTAs that had one extraregional member
(e.g., the United States, EU/EFTA etc.).  This could indicate that there is still a great deal
of untapped potential for developing intraregional trade linkages among ESCAP members.
Table 2.  Trade of BTAs and RTAs in force, 2005*
Share in total ESCAP Share in total world
trade (%) trade (%)
BTAs (61) 16.2 4.7
–  Regional members (33 BTAs) 6.6 1.9
–  Other (28 BTAs) 9.6 2.8
RTAs (11) 13.2 3.9
– Regional members (6 RTAs) 10.2 3.0
Total preferential trade 29.4 8.6
Total ESCAP trade 29.2
Memorandum items:
–  Total ESCAP trade (US$ billion) 5 077
–  Total world trade (US$ billion) 17 405
Source: Computed using APTIAD and COMTRADE data, February 2007.
* Where 2005 trade data are unavailable, the most recent available year is used.
B.  Liberalization patterns
There  is  a  simple  test  for  determining  whether  an  agreement  is  efficient  or
“good” – it must create trade for the members of the agreement without diverting trade
from  the  rest  of  the  world  (ROW).
15    The  literature  over  time  has  also  identified  the
conditions under which net trade creation would be more likely.  The World Bank (2004)
summarizes
16 these as:
14 Note that table 1 shows intra-ESCAP trade as 12.9 per cent of world trade.  Intra-ESCAP trade is
larger than the sum of trade by members of BTA and RTA in implementation (which makes 8.6 per cent
of world trade).
15 This is, of course, a dramatic simplification.  Trade creation and trade diversion should reflect
changes in welfare that are sourced through the replacement of inefficient with more efficient production
among the partners (trade creation) and the opposite in relation to ROW (trade diversion).  As static
measures of welfare change, they do not reflect all efficiency changes that could be arising from RTAs.
Deriving general conclusions based on partial equilibrium analysis is problematic.  The calculation of
trade creation and trade diversion is complex and is not among the objectives of this publication.
16 GATT Article XXIV stipulates some of these in the form of “WTO compliancy”.  In particular, see
paragraph 5 (a), (b) and (c) as well as paragraph 8 (a) and (b).  Similarly, GATS Article V paragraph 4.15
• Number and type of members.  More members with dissimilar economies is
preferable to fewer homogenous economies;
• MFN  tariffs  faced  by  ROW.    Lower  MFN  tariffs  after  the  formation  of  an
agreement will minimize trade diversion;
• Coverage in terms of measures, sectors and products.  A negative list with as
few exemptions as possible is preferred, and with reduction/elimination of all
border trade barriers in a short period;
• Rules  of  origin.    Flexible,  transparent  and  liberal  to  allow  for  more  trade
creation;
• Measures to facilitate trade.  Inclusion of areas and measures beyond good
trade will facilitate cross-border competition and permit more trade creation.
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How  do  Asian-Pacific  trade  agreements  measure  up  against  those  conditions?
Section B comments on them in turn, starting with a summary of the conclusions of the
(already discussed) first point.
1.  Membership in regional trade agreements
As discussed in section A, most of the large number of trade agreements in force in
the region are bilateral (71 per cent).  The largest share of those agreements pair developing
economies (or transition economies) together.  Less then 30 per cent are between two
“diverse economies”, e.g., a developed and a developing economy.  On the other hand,
even though the region accounts for only a small share of RTAs, on average they comprise
about  nine  members;  this  would  go  some  way  towards  meeting  the  criteria  for  large
memberships.
Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  some  40  agreements  are  in  the  process  of
negotiation just in this region, and that most of them include one or more of the major
trading economies of the region (or world), completion of those negotiations might bring
global efficiency improvement into line with this condition on numbers and types of members.
This improvement would arise because an increasing number of countries able to generate
trade creation would be leaving the “outsiders” camp and entering the club of “regional
partners” (thus reducing the potential for trade diversion, ceteris paribus).  However, this
extension of membership cannot occur automatically because, typically, existent agreements
are designed as “closed clubs”.  For example, most RTAs in the region remain closed for
the  current  members  or  future  members  of  the  association  underlying  the  trade
agreement (ASEAN in case of AFTA, BIMSTEC in the case of the BIMSTEC FTA, ECO for
ECOTA,  SAARC  for  SAFTA  and  the  South  Pacific  Forum  for  SPARTECA).    Only  two
agreements  allow  for  expansion  through  direct  members  in  the  trade  agreement:
17 Trade facilitation in regional PTAs is a theme of a separate paper and is therefore not discussed
here  (see  IIBE&L,  2006).    Competition  policy  and  government  procurement  provisions  in  PTAs  of
ESCAP are also not discussed here.16
(a) APTA, but only to the developing members of ESCAP; and (b) PICTA to any State or
territory.  Even with open access to membership, the efficiency-improving outcome would
be more clear-cut in the case of parallel consolidation of these agreements under harmonized
enforcement rules.  Additionally, it is necessary that the agreements satisfy other conditions,
particularly the extent of liberalization.
2.  MFN tariff levels
Table 3 demonstrates trends in unweighted average applied tariff rates in most of
the countries in the region.  It is true that most countries show declining average tariff
rates.  This is a result of combined working of the following forces:
(a) Multilateral trade negotiation of the Uruguay Round and accession to WTO;
(b) Preferential trade liberalization;
(c) Unilateral trade liberalization efforts that many economies in the region have
followed since the early 1990s.
Table 3.  Trends in average applied tariff rates, 1996-2005
a (unweighted, in per cent)
Code Economy/group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (est.)
1 Bangladesh 26.7 26.7 21.3 21.2 19.3 19.9 18.8 16.4 16.8
1 Bhutan 17.5 15.3 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 17.7 22.2 22.2
1 Cambodia 35.0 18.0 18.0 17.0 16.5 16.1 16.0 15.6  
1 India 37.0 34.2 32.4 32.7 30.9 28.3 28.3 16.0
1 Kyrgyz Republic 4.6 4.5 8.2 4.3  
1 Lao PDR 9.5 9.5 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.2
1 Mongolia 5.0 4.9 6.9 6.8 4.9 4.9 4.2
1 Myanmar 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.5
1 Nepal14.8 17.3 21.7 14.2 14.2 14.7 14.6 14.8 14.8 14.7
1 Pakistan 41.7 46.6 45.6 24.1 23.6 20.2 17.2 16.8 16.2 14.3
1 Papua New Guinea 20.7 20.4 20.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 6.1 6.1 5.7
1 Solomon Islands
b 22.7 45.0 24.0 24.0 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.2  
1 Tajikistan
b 8.3 5.0 5.0 8.0 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.0  
1 Uzbekistan 21.0 21.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 10.4 10.6
1 Viet Nam 13.0 13.0 15.6 15.1 15.0 14.3 13.8 13.6 13.1
2 Armenia 5.0 3.7 4.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6
2 Azerbaijan 12.0 12.0 12.0 10.8 9.8 10.1 10.0
2 China 22.0 16.7 16.6 16.3 16.2 15.2 12.3 10.5 9.6 9.0
2 Fiji
b 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 8.3 8.8 7.9
2 Georgia   10.0 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.8 7.6 7.4  
2 Indonesia 10.8 9.9 7.8 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.5
2 Iran, Islamic 28.0 30.0 30.0 37.4 30.0 27.3 18.9 17.7
Rep. of  
2 Kazakhstan
b 10.0 9.3 9.5 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9      
2 Malaysia 8.4 8.9 8.2 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.5
2 Maldives 20.8 22.0 22.0 21.3 21.1 21.2 21.1 21.1 21.2
2 Philippines 14.0 12.7 10.4 9.5 7.1 6.9 5.3 4.5 5.5 5.417
2 Russian Federation 11.2 14.0 13.9 12.6 11.1 10.7 10.3 10.0
2 Samoa
b   18.0 18.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0    
2 Sri Lanka 19.6 11.1 10.9 9.3 8.9 8.9 8.7 9.9 10.8
2 Thailand 16.9 16.4 14.4 13.5 9.9
2 Turkey 7.0 6.7 7.2 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.5
2 Turkmenistan 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 5.4 5.3  
2 Vanuatu   29.0 22.8 22.8 22.8 22.8 17.0 13.8    
3 Brunei Darussalam 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.1
3 Hong Kong, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 Macao, China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 Singapore 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 Australia 6.8 6.6 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 4.2
4 European Union 3.0 2.4 2.9 3.6 2.2 3.1 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.5
4 Japan 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
4 Korea, Rep. of 9.7 9.2 9.7 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.6
4 New Zealand 6.3 6.0 4.7 3.9 3.0 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8
4 United States 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.3 3.1 3.0
Memo:  average   
1 to 2 Developing 17.9 17.7 16.5 14.8 13.7 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.9 10.2
countries (142)
1 Low income (56) 22.4 21.5 20.3 17.9 15.3 13.7 14.0 11.9 13.3 12.1
2 Middle income (86) 13.0 14.3 13.9 12.5 12.3 11.3 10.6 9.6 10.0 8.7
3 High-income 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8
non-OECD (14)
4 High-income 5.5 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.1
OECD (10)
Source: Extracted  from  Francis  K.T.  Ng,  2006,  Data  on  Trade  and  Import  Barriers,  World  Bank
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/tar2005.xls).
Note:
a All  tariff  rates  are  based  on  unweighted  averages  for  all  goods  in  ad  valorem  rates,
applied rates or MFN rates whichever data is available for a longer period.  Tariff data are
primarily based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development TRAINS
database, with WTO IDB data used for filling gaps, where possible.  Data for the 1980s
are taken from other sources.
b Tariff data in these countries came from the IMF Global Monitoring Tariff file in 2004, and
might include other duties or charges.
Country codes are based on the classifications by income in WDI 2006, where 1 = low
income, 2 = middle income, 3 = high-income non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries, and 4 = high-income OECD countries.
Table 3 (continued)
Code Economy/group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (est.)
With regard to MFN tariffs faced by ROW after the conclusion of the agreements, it
is difficult to acquire exact and reliable data.  The fact that among the regional RTAs there
is only one partially functioning CU (EAEC) means there is no real threat from the creation
of high common external tariffs.  Figure VIII shows the level of average applied tariffs of
10 RTAs (AFAS not included) for 2005 calculated from table 3 or in the most recent year
when 2005 information was unavailable (annex figure I shows individual countries in each
of the 10 RTAs).  This average ranges from 7.5 per cent for AFTA to 16.6 per cent for
SAFTA.  In fact, SAFTA is the only RTA in which all individual members’ averages stand at18
above 10 per cent, while in AFTA only Cambodia and Viet Nam have more than 10 per
cent average applied tariffs.  APTA, on average, has slightly higher protection than the
RTAs taken together, mainly because of the relatively high averages of Bangladesh and
India.
Figure VIII.  Simple average of applied unweighted tariffs of individual
countries grouped in RTAs (2005)
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3.  Approaches to tariff reductions in PTAs
How important is the contribution of preferential trade liberalization to the opening
of a country?  As noted above, declarative aspirations of all agreements are to transform
trade among partners into duty-free trade.  In many agreements, in fact, this is expressed
as an ultimate goal; however, partners are taking many different routes to achieve this
end.  Table 4 summarizes the difference in approaches to tariff reduction in the enforced
agreements that provide this information.  A positive list approach is considered, in principle,
less liberalizing and it consists of members agreeing to the products on the (positive) list
whose tariffs will be reduced or eliminated.  A negative list approach assumes a reduction/
elimination of tariffs on all products except those that are included in the negative list.  This
approach is closer to the spirit of GATT, even though it may often include a long list of
excluded products.19
Another important factor is the determination of a base tariff rate as a benchmark
for  reduction.    In  most  cases,  the  MFN-applied  rates  are  used  for  this  purpose
(cf. Feridhanusetyawan, 2005, p. 16).  In an effort to comply with WTO rules on regional
agreements,  most  contain  an  intention  to  eliminate  tariffs  within  what  is  considered
a reasonable period.  When an LDC is involved, it is provided either with longer transition
periods (e.g., AFTA) or lesser or no reduction commitments (e.g., APTA).  Another interesting
feature, and which supports previous claims about “made-to-measure” agreements, refers
to  asymmetrical  reciprocity  in  tariff  reduction  even  when  there  is  no  LDC  involved.
Feridhanusetyawan  (2005,  p.  17)  describes  how,  in  the  Singapore-United  States  FTA
(which follows the “negative list approach”), the United States kept tariffs on about 8 per
cent of products during the transition period of eight years while Singapore eliminated all
tariffs  immediately,  binding  them  to  zero.    In  the  Singapore-Japan  FTA  (which  follows
a positive list approach), Singapore again reduced all tariffs to zero immediately while
Japan committed to eliminating its tariffs gradually over a 10-year period.
Table 4.  Tariff reduction approaches
PTAs Positive list Negative list
All in force with information available 31 33
BTA 22 25





Framework agreement 4 1
Preferential trading arrangement 6 2
CU 0 1
Non-reciprocal arrangement 1 0
Source: Compiled by the author from APTIAD, February 2007.
4.  Rules of origin
The current proliferation of agreements has spun a complex rules-of-origin web
(table 5).  In addition to each agreement having its own rules of origin, a bewildering array
of product-specific rules of origin is emerging.  Adopting the less restrictive rules of origin
could result in significant trade deflection and redundancy of a trade agreement, while
adopting the most restrictive rules of origin may result in no trade taking place under the
agreement.  Several chances have been missed, at both the WTO and regional levels, to
bring some uniformity to the formulation of preferential rules of origin.  GATT Article XXIV,
quite remarkably, is silent on the use of preferential rules of origin.  Should rules of origin
not be viewed just as other regulations of commerce, in that they should not raise barriers20
to third countries any higher than the level existing prior to the formation of the PTA?  The
most that is said is embodied in a non-binding common declaration on principles.
This increases the urgency for establishing an overarching, region-wide, common
framework of principles, guidelines and procedures to which BTAs and RTAs would be
anchored.  Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, the point of departure should be the
WTO common declaration.  Ongoing work, notably in APEC, and other useful trade and
development elements found in other agreements should be built upon with this need in
mind.  For example, APTA recently agreed to common rules of origin (representing a wide
spectrum of industrial development among the members) that are relatively simple, general
and liberal, that is:
(a) A flat rate of a minimum 45 per cent of local value content (35 per cent for
least developed countries) in bilateral rules of origin; and
(b) At least 60 per cent (50 per cent for least developed countries) of regional
content with full cumulation (cf. Baldwin, 2006).
Table 5.  Rules of origin provisions in selected trade agreements
PTA Change in Specific man. Local value Cumulation
tariff class. process addition
BTAs
ASEAN-China Yes ... 40% Full
ASEAN- Yes ... 40% Full
Republic of Korea
Australia- ... ... 50% Bilateral
New Zealand
India-Thailand Yes (or VA) ... 20-40% Bilateral
4, 6 digit level product specific
product specific F.O.B. value
India-Sri Lanka Yes (or VA) ... 35% Bilateral
4 digit level F.O.B. value
Japan-Mexico ... No specific 50% with some Bilateral
process required exception
F.O.B value
Republic of Korea- ... No specific 45% build down Bilateral
Chile process required method calculation,
30% build up
method calculation
Malaysia-Japan Yes (product ... 40% (product Bilateral
specific) specific)
Singapore- Yes ... 45-55% Bilateral
Republic of Korea
Singapore-Japan Yes (or VA) Yes 60% Bilateral
4 digit level F.O.B. value21
Singapore-USA Yes (or VA) Yes 30-60% Bilateral
2, 4, 6 digit level product specific
Singapore- ... ... 40% Bilateral
New Zealand Factory cost
Singapore-Australia ... ... 30-50% Bilateral
product specific
factory costs
Thailand-Australia Yes (and/or VA) Yes 40-55% Bilateral
4, 6 digit level product specific
product specific F.O.B. value
Thailand- Yes (product Yes Bilateral
New Zealand specific)
BTAs
Asia-Pacific Trade No tariff beading No specific 45% Full
Agreement change necessary process required (35% for LDC)
ASEAN Free Trade No tariff beading No specific 40% Full
Agreement change necessary process specified F.O.B. value




Source: Compiled from table 2 in Bonapace and Mikic (2006), and APTIAD.
Table 5 (continued)
PTA Change in Specific man. Local value Comulation
tariff class process addition
Consolidation  of  multiple  membership  agreements  around  more  liberal  rules  of
origin  will  serve  as  a  tool  for  diminishing  noodle  bowl-related  costs  of  trading  under
preferential regimes.  One such example is provided by the recent consolidation of bilateral
trade  agreements  among  the  southern  European  countries  and  a  replacement  by  the
common rules as part of an amended Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
deal.    The  new  CEFTA  consolidates  32  bilateral  free  trade  agreements  into  a  single
regional trade agreement.  The free trade area will be established for a transitional period
ending, at the latest, on 31 December 2010.  The new consolidated agreement replaces
the network (the “spaghetti bowl”) of bilateral free trade agreements in order to improve
conditions for promoting trade and investment by means of fair, clear, stable and predictable
rules.
The  agreement  consolidates  and  modernizes  the  region’s  “rule  book”  on  trade,
and  includes  modern  trade  provisions  on  issues  such  as  competition,  government
procurement  and  protection  of  intellectual  property.    It  facilitates  the  convergence  of
relevant trade-related rules, notably with regard to industrial and sanitary-phytosanitary
rules.  A simplified single system of rules of origin (and other rules) makes it easier to trade
within  the  region.    Increased  trade  is  necessary  to  promote  growth,  job  creation  and22
a reduction in youth unemployment.  It is the foundation for stability and peace.  Such
harmonization and simplification of rules of origin in the subregions of Asia could contribute
to a deepening of integration, as the rules are associated with an increase in “seamless
production”.
5.  Going beyond the goods trade
18
Many of the newer initiatives declare the intention to go well beyond the reduction/
elimination of tariffs and NTBs, including anti-dumping and safeguards, harmonization of
competition  policies  and  standards,  and  customs.    However,  a  large  number  still  just
remain a collection of aspirations towards liberalization that tend to be associated with
a longer negotiation process.  In addition, despite these intentions to go deeper than trade
integration, there is only an occasional mention of the formation of a CU or a common
market in the Asia-Pacific region.
19
Furthermore, while in the context of multilateral liberalization, a number of countries
strongly argue for more freedom in movements of labour (referring to Mode 4 liberalization)
when it comes to BTAs and RTAs, as only few cover this area.  A comparison of BTAs/
RTAs of this region with existing deals in the Americas also illustrates a type of reluctance
to negotiate all-inclusive comprehensive agreements.  Instead, trade agreements are often
accompanied  by  separate  agreements  on  services,  investments,  intellectual  property
protection, customs procedures etc.  Most of the new agreements cover trade in services
(but pre-General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] agreements still have separate
agreements on trade in services, such as the ASEAN FAS).
Most of the newer agreements could be described as WTO-plus agreements as
they extend concessionary coverage beyond multilaterally agreed disciplines – such as
government procurement, competition policy and the environment.  This is true for trade
agreements  between  developed  economies,  and  between  developed  and  developing
economies (Lesher and Miroudot, 2006).  It is important to note that most agreements
mention a number of WTO-plus sectors when describing the objectives of the agreement
(typically  in  the  preamble  of  the  agreement  text).    However,  a  significant  number  of
agreements  only  include  a  statement  of  intention  to  negotiate  liberalization  in  certain
areas.  These agreements have been excluded from the scope of this study because they
do not count for “substantive commitments”.
The overview that is provided in figure IX only shows whether a concessionary
commitment  has  been  made  in  particular  sectors  or  not.    In  order  to  provide  a  better
assessment of the beyond-the-goods commitments, a more detailed analysis of the legal
texts of the agreements is required.  The most frequently covered area is that of investments
18 Some of the agreements do not have legal texts, either publicly available in English or at all, and
therefore might not have been captured properly in counting the sectors covered.
19 One such example is that of the already cited “single economic market” of Australia and New
Zealand.  At the zenith of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there were also calls for the establishment of
a currency union.  They were later merged into proposals for an East Asian Community.23
provisions followed by IPRs and trade facilitation.  Other areas that also receive some
coverage are government procurement, competition policies and labour mobility.  Services
are  covered  only  in  24  agreements,  including  separate  agreements  for  some  parties.
Table 6 provides a summary of treatments of four sectors (investment, IPR, labour mobility
and services) with a view to differentiating between BTAs and other agreements in terms
of the coverage of these sectors.
Figure IX.  Overview of sectoral coverage by PTAs
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In terms of scope of agreement, it is obvious that the “beyond-the-goods” sectors
are captured by agreements that are bilateral, i.e., between two countries and between an
established bloc and a country.  It is mostly FTAs that venture beyond goods liberalization,
except in investment where FAs feature, too.  It also appears that BTAs-FTAs are notified
to WTO faster than other agreements, contributing towards transparency of trading rules
at the global level.
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C.  Preferential trade and agriculture
With regard to the coverage of goods liberalization, available empirical literature
shows  that  most  of  the  agreements  focus  on  reducing  or  eliminating  tariffs  and  other
barriers to industrial goods or manufactures.  In contrast, agricultural products tend to be
included in the exemptions of the negative lists or excluded from the positive lists of tariff
20 For some comments on the content of provisions on these sectors, see Mikic (2007).24
Table 6.  Summary of treatments of selected sectors in preferential trade
agreements in Asia and the Pacific
Intellectual property protection
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 19
a 16 (7)  17 (7)
Country-bloc  6
b 2  (1) –  5 (3)
RTA 2 1 – – 1  2
Other 1 1 – – –  –
Total 28 (9) 21 (8) 3 (1) 3  24 (10)
Investment
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 23
c 17 (4) 5 – 1 17 (4)
Country-bloc 6 2 4 – – 3
RTA 3 2 1 – – 1
Other 1 1 – – –
Total  33
a(4) 21 (4) 11 – 1 21 (4)
Mobility of labour
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
B T A 871– – 7
Country-bloc 1 – 1 – – –
R T A 211– – –
Other 1 1 – – – –
Total  12 9 3 – – 7
Services
Total
Type of agreement Notified to
FTA FA CU Other WTO
BTA 18 17 1 – – 14
Country-bloc  3 2 1 – – 3
R T A   2–2– –   –
Other  1 1 – – –  –
Total 24 20 4 – – 17
Source: APTIAD and annex tables 2-5 in Mikic, 2007.
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of agreements involving Turkey.
a Includes seven BTAs between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Israel, Romania and Tunis.
b Includes one agreement between Turkey and EFTA, and one between Turkey and the
European Union.
c Includes four BTAs between Turkey and Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Romania and Tunis.25
reductions.
21, 22  Other chapters in this publication deal with preferential trade liberalization
in agricultural products in great detail.  As an introduction to these chapters, some views
are  offered  here  on  why  there  is  asymmetry  between  agricultural  and  industrial  goods
coverage in PTAs.  The list here is not exhaustive and in the chapters that follow, these
and some other important reasons are discussed in greater detail.
Table 7.  Leading forces influencing the degree of agricultural trade liberalization
Forces against liberalization Forces for liberalization
• Intense lobbying by agricultural interest • The Uruguay Round Agreement on
groups Agriculture and the Cairns Group
• The argument for food security • Agricultural policy inconsistencies in the
• Quality standards and food safety developed world
• Intrinsic characteristics of agriculture • New domestic pressures
• Agricultural non-trade concerns • Growing international pressures
• Food dependence (net food importers) • Internationalization of agribusiness
• Preferential trade agreements    corporations
• International migration of farmers
Source: Jank, Fuchsloch and Kutaes (2002).
The five reasons why agriculture does not feature prominently on the agenda for
full and/or quick liberalization through PTAs are that:
(a) Agriculture was excluded from the multilateral trade liberalization efforts until
the  Uruguay  Round,  leaving  space  for  protectionist  policies  in  this  sector,
which is one of the most supported sectors in many developed economies.
This  combination  of  policies  earned  the  sector  the  attribute  of  being  the
“most  distorted”  in  the  world  economy.    Obviously,  the  removal  of  trade
barriers and domestic support in such circumstances is not a simple matter.
The  task  is  complicated  equally  by  the  influence  of  vested  interests,  and
a  need  for  a  coherent  set  of  policy  measures  and  financial  resources  to
provide corrective support during the adjustment period, which could extend
over a decade;
(b) Agriculture  produces  food  that  is  considered  indispensable  to  human  life,
thus giving rise to concern over food safety and security.  These issues are
easier to include in multilateral negotiations with more players (and coalitions)
and more possibilities for quid pro quo than in similar negotiations with fewer
21 Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (2005).    Samaratunga  and  others
(2006) and chapter II of this book and Pasadilla (2006) and chapter III of this book report similar
findings for the agreements they analysed.
22 For the purposes of international trade statistics, agriculture is defined as chapters 0-24 of the
two-digit HS classification.26
members, particularly when the negotiations are among those with similar
interests in this area;
(c) Agriculture  appears  to  offer  more  fertile  ground  than  other  sectors  for
quantitative and export barriers as well as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
barriers and standard IPRs (that is, geographic indicators).  Historical evidence
shows that these issues are easier to deal with at the global or multilateral
level than at the regional level;
(d) Continuous  support  and  protection  of  agriculture  in  developed  economies
has been justified by the so-called “multifunctionality” argument of agriculture.
The sector is also often linked to environmental quality.  It is easy to see that
when  two  countries  with  same  “defensive”  approach  in  relation  to
multifunctionality negotiate a bilateral agreement, the scope for liberalization
in agriculture will remain narrower than in negotiations at the multilateral level
among countries with diverse interests in this area;
(e) Last, but far from least relevant, in many developing countries, agriculture is
still  a  very  important,  if  not  the  most  important  sector  of  the  economy  in
fighting poverty.  In many developing countries, agriculture provides opportunities
for  people  to  grow  their  own  food  and  to  exchange  surpluses  in  informal
transactions without being registered as part of an official economy (e.g., in
employment or tax revenue records).  For example, while agriculture provided
paid employment in India for only 5 per cent of the labour force during 2004,
its rural population forms the largest part of the total population.  This means
the  sector  is  instrumental  in  ensuring  rural  development  and  provision  of
livelihood security.  When it comes to the negotiation of preferential liberalization,
which often embraces “made to measure” liberalization, this sector (is more
likely than others) will be granted longer transitional periods, lesser tariff cuts
and other exemptions in order for it to become a vehicle for rural development.
In  developing  this  last  point  further,  it  would  appear  that  preferential  trade
liberalization is more in line with the objectives of strategic intervention in agricultural trade
than is multilateral liberalization.  As argued by Dhar (2007) (see also chapter VII of this
book)  and  literature  cited  therein,  concern  over  food  security,  livelihoods  and  rural
development in developing countries can be responded to by adopting the twin instruments
of Special Products (SP) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) as a variant of
a strategic agricultural trade policy.  The goal of this policy is primarily to secure food and
safeguard  livelihoods  rather  than  create  trade.    Judging  by  the  difficulties  surrounding
multilateral negotiations on these points as well as the comparatively easier introduction of
SP and SSM into preferential trade agreements (cf. Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and  Development,  2005,  pp.  16-17),  PTAs  ought  to  be  ranked  superior  to  multilateral
liberalization  in  delivering  this  particular  goal.    However,  further  empirical  research  is
desirable in order to shed more light on the welfare-improving effects of this particular
strategic approach.27
D.  Conclusions
This chapter clarifies what types of preferential trade agreements are emerging in
Asia and the Pacific, and it establishes the fact that they vary widely in motivation, form,
coverage and content.  It finds that PTAs in Asia and the Pacific leave much to be desired
in terms of meeting established criteria for “best practice” or model agreements.  Bilateral
agreements are much preferred to plurilateral or regional ones, while “free” trade areas/
agreements are the most frequent form.  However, in most cases, they push achievement
of  “free”  trade  for  several  years  in  the  future.    Increasingly,  countries  are  opting  for
a partnership or framework agreement – in principle, to signal that either they mean much
more than trade integration or that they really do not mean serious trade integration, but
are using the format to put together a framework of cooperation in several (non-trade-
related) areas.  More often, the latter is the case.  This probably explains to some degree
why a number of countries sign multiple agreements with the same partners.
Analysis has also discovered a reluctance to commit to full and quick liberalization
in merchandise trade and to expose “other than goods” trade areas (including WTO-plus)
to preferential liberalization.  The coverage and extent of agricultural products in PTAs is
mostly unsatisfactory from the WTO compliance and welfare-increasing perspectives.  A
necessary next step in research is to establish conceptual frameworks for the consolidation
of multiple PTAs, and to determine empirically if and by how much such consolidation of
existing  preferential  deals  will  improve  welfare  and  reduce  poverty  compared  with  the
current situation.28
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Annex table 1.  Comparison of rules of origin applicable to trade
between India and Sri Lanka*
FTA between India and
APTA AFTA
Sri Lanka
Determination of origin of not wholly obtained products
Article 7.a Rule 3(a) Rule 8(a) (ii)
…products worked on or …products worked on or …products worked on or
processed as a result of processes as a result of processed as a result of
which the total value of the which the total value of the which the total value of the
materials, part or produce materials, parts or produce materials, parts or produce
originating from countries originating from originating from other
other than Contracting non-participating States or of countries or of undermined
Parties or of undetermined undetermined origin used origin used does not exceed
origin used does not exceed does not exceed 55 per cent 60 per cent of the f.o.b. value
65 per cent of the f.o.b. of the f.o.b. value of the of the products produced or
value, and the process of products produced or obtained, and the final
manufacture is performed obtained, and the finalprocess of manufacture is
within the territory of the process of manufacture is performed within the territory
exporting Contracting performed within the territory of the exporting Contracting
Party. of the exporting participating State (70 per cent for LDC
State. and 65 per cent for
Sri Lanka).
Article 7.b Rule 3(c) Formula: Rule 8(a) (i)
Non-originating materials Value
M + Value
O The final product is classified
shall be considered to be f.o.b. price in a heading at the four-digit
sufficiently worked or Where M = imported level of the HCDCS differently
processed when the product non-originating materials, from those in which all the
obtained is classified in parts or produce; and non-originating materials
a heading, at the four-digit O = undetermined origin used in its manufacture are
level, of the HCDCS, materials, parts or produce classified.
different from those in which (65 per cent for LDC).
all the non-originating
materials used in its
manufacture are classified.
Article 7.e Rule 3(d) Rule 11(a):
The value of the The value of the The value of the
non-originating materials, non-originating materials, non-originating materials,
parts or produce shall be: parts or produce shall be: parts or produce shall be:
i. The c.i.f. value at the i. The c.i.f. value at the time i. The c.i.f. value at the
time of importation of of importation …where time of importation of
the materials, parts or this can be proven; or the materials, parts or
produce where this can ii. The earliest ascertainable produce where this can
be proven; or price paid for…in the be proven; or
ii. The earliest ascertainable territory of the participating ii. The earliest ascertainable
price paid for the materials, State  where the working price paid for the materials,
parts or produce of or processing takes place. parts or produce of
x 100 ≤ 55%32
undetermined origin in the undetermined origin in the
territory of the Contracting territory of the Contracting
Parties where the working States where the working or
or processing takes place. processing takes place.
Cumulation
Article 8 Rule 4 Rule 9
The value addition in the The aggregate content The aggregate content
territory of the exporting originating in the territory of (value of such inputs plus
Contracting Party shall not the participating States is not domestic value addition in
be less than 25 per cent less than 60 per cent of its further manufacture) is not
of the f.o.b. value of the f.o.b. value (50 per cent for less than 50 per cent of the
product under export, and the LDC). f.o.b. value; The domestic
aggregate value addition in value contents (value of
territory of the Contracting inputs originating in the
Parties is not less than exporting Contracting State
35 per cent of the plus domestic value addition
f.o.b. value of the product in further manufacture in the
under export. exporting Contracting State)
is not less than 20 per cent
of the f.o.b. value; And the
final product satisfies the
condition of change in
classification at the four-digit
level CTH.
Source: Compiled from respective rules of origin of each agreement downloadable from APTIAD.
* While  these  two  countries  are  also  members  of  BIMSTEC  (other  members  include
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and Thailand), there is no electronically accessible
legal text of that agreement; furthermore, rules of origin have yet to be negotiated so they
could not be included in the table.
Annex table 1  (continued)
FTA between India and
APTA AFTA
Sri Lanka